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Privacy as an archival problem and a solution
Abstract
People feel that their privacy is violated when information about them is passed inappropriately from one
context or social sphere to another. This makes records and archives management a focal point of privacy
issues, because its goal is to transfer information from one context, place, and point in time to other contexts,
places, and points in time. Society has a number of mechanisms (“strategies”) for protecting the privacy of
people. The article examines five of them (purpose limitation, privacy self-management and right to be
forgotten, destruction, anonymization, and information safe haven approach) and the limits they set to the
contextual transfer of information. If the strategies are implemented in society without regard to archival
needs, archives have difficulties in fulfil ling their functions in society. Therefore, records professionals
should make their point of view known when privacy issues are discussed. Records professionals also should
be aware of the mutability of the category of personally identifiable information and the changing nature of
privacy issues in the digital environment.
Introduction
It is impossible to imagine an area in records and archives management that has not
been transformed by digitalization: by the adoption of digital or computer technology
in the society and the way many domains of social life are restructured around digital
communication and media infrastructures (Brennen and Scott 2014). Digitalization has
changed the way information is created, managed, preserved, disseminated, and used.
This has changed our information environment and the nature of privacy problems.
Digitalization has made privacy a burning issue.
This paper examines what has happened to privacy in the digital environment and
how it affects archives. Traditional archival processes were adapted to working with
paper documents, but today—and increasingly in future—challenges in protecting
privacy are different from what they were some decades ago. Although the literature on
privacy in the digital environment is vast, most writers ignore the archival point of
view. Therefore, it is important to look at what has been written about privacy in the
changing information environment and put it in relationship with the archival
mission—which is to preserve information that has been found worthy of preservation
by making impartial reasoned judgments about its value for future generations. My
argument is that the way the society protects the privacy of people is crucial for
archives. It influences what information is generated, how it is stored and how it can be
accessed. At the same time, archival techniques—and recordkeeping techniques in
general—are critical for the protection of personal privacy now and in the future.
In this article, the first section discusses how digitalization has changed the
questions of privacy. The second section argues that archives are in the focal point
when it comes to privacy because they carry information between contexts. The third
section examines societal strategies which are common in Western societies for
protecting privacy from the archival perspective: binding to purpose, privacy self-
management and right to be forgotten, destruction, anonymization, and information
safe haven approach. Finally, the paper suggests areas that records professionals should
follow closely and in which they should be active.
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2Changing form of privacy issues
Article 12 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” (United Nations
1948)
Underpinning the 12th article one can see some of the ideas that have formed the
backbone of traditional thinking about privacy. First is the idea that there is a private
space distinct from the public space. One needs protection in the private space: it is the
space that must be protected from arbitrary interference and attacks (Nissenbaum 1998).
Secondly, a general assumption has been that the source of attacks to privacy is the
state (Duchein 1983, p 19; MacNeil 1992, pp 35–36). Thirdly, there are categories of
information that belong to the sphere of privacy (like civil status and affiliation, health,
wealth and income, political and religious opinions, family honor, and so on) (Duchein
1983, p 20). Although the list of the categories that are considered sensitive varies from
one country to another it is assumed that we can identify sensitive and non-sensitive
information by looking at it.
Today all these assumptions are inadequate if not entirely wrong. Privacy threats
posed by computerized information processing have been evident for a long time (see
Hedstrom 1981), but the development of the networked society has exacerbated them.
Firstly, while governments and security organizations collect more information about
citizens than ever before they are not the sole threat to privacy. In addition to the state,
private enterprises gather vast amounts of information. This information can be on-sold
to a new party which may combine it with other information from public and non-
public sources.
Even more important for archives is what has happened to the other traditional
assumptions about privacy: the idea that we can separate both private and public space
and private and non-private information. The borderlines—if they exist—are no more
self-evident. The capacity of society to record, recall and process information has
exponentially grown with digitalization. Although the change is in many ways more
quantitative than qualitative it has destroyed the distinction between public and private
space and private and public information.
Traditionally, it was thought that a person needs protection in the private space, but
not in the public space. What happened in the public space could be observed by
everyone and distributing information about it could not be circumscribed without
limiting others’ freedom of expression. However, in practice the capability for
observation and storing of information was limited, and a person in a public space—in
a busy street, for instance—could be observed by all and still be unnoticed by everyone.
Today, every action that takes place on the internet can be tracked, saved, and analyzed
indefinitely. What happens is never missed by those who want observe it. Information
can be kept in memory and shared with new audiences almost without a limit
(Nissenbaum 1998). “Since the beginning of time, for us humans, forgetting has been
the norm and remembering the exception”, notes Viktor Mayer-Schönberger. Now,
“…because of digital technology, society’s ability to forget has become suspended,
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3replaced by perfect memory.” (Mayer-Schönberger 2011, pp 2, 4.) What takes place in
public can be kept in a memory indefinitely.
Private space has experienced a similar transformation. What happened in the
private space was previously confined between four walls and subject to mis-hearing
and human forgetfulness. Today smart phones and gadgets like Google Glass make it
possible to record what happens in private and further distribute this information
immediately. In addition, “secondhand data leakage” is growing in prevalence,
meaning that one person’s action impacts another’s private data (for example, when a
friend declares a co-location with us, or a blood relative unveils her genome) (Hubaux
and Juels 2016). Big data involves not only individuals’ digital footprints (data they
themselves leave behind), but, perhaps more importantly, also individuals’ data
shadows (information about them generated by others) (Koops 2011). This means that
the walls protecting private space are crumbling. All spaces are potentially public.
Furthermore, exponential growth in the society’s capacity to record, recall and
process information is destroying any distinction between private and non-private
information. One may argue that it has always been a borderline drawn in water.
Privacy can be understood as a self-evident quality inherent in documents only if it
assumed that archives are mere repositories of inert documents whose meaning is fixed
and fully-present. This proposition has been challenged and questioned for a long time
now. Restrictions protecting private documents are themselves conditions that are built
in part of documents’ meaning, interpretation and value (Dever 2012). In addition,
while privacy is seemingly a universal concept, what is private and under what
circumstances differs widely between groups of people and over time. For instance, in
the United States even the archivist appraising records of the FBI was not allowed to
see income tax return information in the files, but in Sweden, by contrast, personal
income tax information is open to public immediately (Duchein 1983, pp 19–22;
Huskamp Peterson 2007). Thus, something becomes private when it is interpreted as
private.
However, digitalization has made the distinction between private and non-private
blurred in a new way. Everything can be tracked in the digital environment. When all
the innocent and nothing-to-hide information about what we do in the public space—
e.g. go shopping, make friendships, support a good cause, have discussions—is put
together little room is left for the privacy even though any single item of information
by itself would not form a privacy threat. This has two consequences. Firstly,
protecting private space is not enough. People need protection also in the public space
and protection from the gathering of seemingly innocuous pieces of information: they
need “privacy in public”, as Helen Nissenbaum (1998) has argued. Secondly,
identifying information that threatens privacy is more difficult, because it is the
accumulation of information that is decisive, rather than the individual facts.
Privacy and records and archives management
Ivan Szekely (2014) has argued that archives are now moving from the “public
paradigm”—in which the archivist was the key professional giving access to the state,
historians, and learned or concerned public in reading rooms and via public services—
to the “global paradigm” where IT professionals and information brokers deliver global
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4services to all internet users. Records professionals should ask how the change of
privacy issues in the digital environment affects their work. A disconcerting answer
would be that it does not have any major implications. In that case, records
professionals may have been superseded by other information management
professionals—as Szekely seems to suggest—from the core of digital information
management.
In my view records and archives management is even more closely intertwined with
privacy issues than it may first seem. The connection is in part hidden because privacy
is a theoretically challenging concept, although it seems straightforward at first glance.
Privacy is like an elephant: easy to recognize, difficult to describe (Young 1978;
MacNeil 1992, p 9). We do not have a good theory about what privacy is and why it
matters so much to us (Schonsheck 1997).
Nevertheless, it seems that we cannot speak about privacy without also talking about
contexts of information usage. It was already noted that any violation of privacy is in
part a matter of interpretation and dependent on the context where the interpretation is
made. Helen Nissenbaum (1998) emphasizes contextuality of privacy from another
perspective. She states that a key to privacy is considering “contextual integrity”. By
this she means that we all have a sense of what is appropriate usage of our information.
It feels acceptable that the doctor who is treating us has access to our medical records
or that the merchant by whom we make our daily shopping knows what we have
bought, but if this information is spread beyond this intuitively appropriate sphere we
feel that our privacy has been violated. In short, we are willing to share information
with others in a particular context and for a particular purpose—for which we have
weighted pros and cons (Mayer-Schönberger 2011, p 101). Jonathan Schonscheck
(1997) notes among others (see Vistilä and Ruokonen 2016) that we are members of a
number of social spheres: there are close friends, spouse, nuclear family, extended
family, and specialized spheres like “me and my banker”, to name only few. It is
essential that one can control what information is available to any of these spheres.
(Schonsheck 1997.)
More crucial than the number of spheres is here the very idea that the privacy is
being violated when information crosses borders of “contexts” or “social spheres”.
Records and archives management is at the focal point of privacy issues, because it
exists precisely to transfer information in usable and understandable form from one
context and point in time to another context and time. This idea repeats itself in
different forms in records and archives management literature. For instance, in the life
cycle model an organization first uses records to support its work. Thereafter they are
transferred to an archival institution to be used by new user groups for purposes for
which the records were not initially created. While the records continuum model, on
the other hand, does not make a distinction between the active or semi-active phase of
records (records management) and the historical phase (archives), it also states that
records (and archives) serve several users and purposes in different contexts. The
records continuum model shows how records and archives management consists of
processes that make information available to ever larger user groups starting from the
immediate neighborhood of information creation inside the organization and expanding
from that to the whole organization and finally to the society at large. (For life cycle
and records continuum models, see e.g. An 2003.) A third example: Recordkeeping
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5Metadata Working Meeting of the Dutch Archiefschool and Netherlands Institute for
Archival Education and Research noted in year 2000 that recordkeeping metadata
functions supports the transfer of records across domains and over time. Recordkeeping
metadata was consequently defined as "structured or semi-structured information which
enables the creation, management, and use of records through time and within and
across domains in which they are created." (Hedstrom 2000, 2001.)
If records and archives management consists among other things of a set of
processes which transfer and offer access to information across contextual, spatial, and
temporal boundaries and the very crossing of boundaries itself creates privacy
violations then issues of privacy are bound to rise. As Elena Danielson (2010) notes,
“the violation of privacy is an intrinsic and unavoidable part of archival work, because
it involves the secondary use of documents, which were originally created for another,
so called primary, purpose.” However, the crossing of boundaries does not happen only
when the information comes to an archive to be used for secondary purposes. It also
happens when information is shared inside the organization, with interest groups, or
delivered to supervisory bodies. While the transition of information into the sphere of
secondary use represents a profound contextual change, as Danielson argues, smaller
contextual transfers happen all the time. Also this shapes the records. If information
does not remain “private” (in the sense that it would be known only by its creator or a
small network of trusted parties) it shapes the record’s content and people’s behavior
from the beginning. Something is perhaps left unrecorded or what is said is modified to
fit the expected audience. All records presume an audience (Maanen and Pentland 1994,
p 54). Records are often produced to document the performance of a given
organizational task. In those cases, organizational members devote at least a part of
their labor to the creation of the desired impression as expressed by means of
documentation. If it is not known who is going to use the information and for what
purpose, it is safest to assume the worst. In the digital world we are living in Bentham’s
panopticon without spatial and temporal limits: we do not know if our current actions
are being (or if they will be) watched, but it is better to be cautious and behave
accordingly (Mayer-Schönberger 2011, pp 109-11).
For archives this creates a danger of a “chilling effect” or “empty archives” -
syndrome: to avoid responsibility or blame information is sanitized or meetings
conducted in ways (e.g. in telephone) that do not create a record (about Hillary
Clinton’s refusal to keep diary, see Danielson 2010; Pasquier and Villeneuve 2007;
Shepherd 2015; about the lack of empirical evidence for chilling effect, see Worthy
2010).
Societal strategies for protecting privacy
In the literature, one can identify several “societal strategies”—possible courses of
action—for protecting the privacy of individuals. Society can 1) follow the purpose
limitation principle 2) rely on information self-management and acknowledge the right
to be forgotten, 3) destroy information, 4) anonymize information, or 5) create for
personal information a safe haven where the information is kept protected until it can
be opened for public access. The five strategies have been selected here for closer
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6examination because they have corollaries for records and archives management by
setting limits to the contextual transfer of information.
The five strategies have a common feature in that you can find them in slightly
different forms everywhere in legislation, standards, and textbooks of best practice.
Strategy implementations may vary. The focus here is on the strategies themselves and
their impact on the contextual transfer, not on the way a strategy can be implemented.
While a strategy implementation, like building a digital privacy rights infrastructure, is
also socially important, it does not change the underlying strategy itself. For instance,
being transparent about what data is collected, why, and for what purpose (“fair
processing”) does not itself change the strategy and the limits it sets to the contextual
transfer of information. Another example is the “MyData” concept. MyData refers to a
shared technical infrastructure that empowers individuals as managers of data about
them. Thus, it is a manifestation of the second strategy in which the person is given the
power over personal information about himself.
Many of the societal strategies were first introduced in the code for Fair Information
Practices (FIP). The code was created in year 1973 by the advisory committee of the
US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The immediate impetus for the FIP
was the increasing use of computers for the transaction of ordinary government and
business transactions. In 1980 both the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe published guidelines that relied on
the FIP core principles. Although today few writers outside the circle of records
professionals explicitly mention records when they write about the privacy issues, the
original FIP code stated that its fundamental principles “require adherence of record-
keeping organizations” (Gellman 2016.) Next the five strategies are discussed one by
one.
Purpose limitation principle
The first societal strategy for protecting privacy is to follow the purpose limitation
principle. In essence, the purpose limitation principle provides that any processing of
personal information must be compatible with the purpose or purposes specified and
expressed at the time of the collection of the information (Rauhofer 2014). Four
international privacy instruments (the OECD guidelines, Council of Europe
Convention, EU Data Protection Directive, and the Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework) share today this idea (Greenleaf 2012). It
has its origin in the basic FIP principles of 1973 (Gellman 2014). The effectiveness of
the purpose limitation principle depends on the society’s willingness to abide by
present information privacy principles in the future (Mayer-Schönberger 2011, p 138).
Privacy self-management and right to be forgotten
Another alternative is to give the power over personal information to the person
concerned. In this strategy, the person decides either about the usage of information
(privacy self-management) or about the destruction of information (right to be
forgotten). The ideas of privacy self-management and right to be forgotten are
conceptually distinct and they do not have the same historical background. However,
they are grouped here together because in both the subject decides what happens to the
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7information. The right to be forgotten is here seen as the ultimate form of privacy self-
management: deleting data by the request of the individual ensures that no-one will
ever have access to it.
The idea of privacy self-management is that people have control over their personal
data and they evaluate themselves the costs and benefits of collection, use or disclosure
of their information. Privacy self-management does not take a stance on whether
certain forms of collecting, using, or disclosing personal information are good or bad.
Nearly all forms can be legitimized by consent (Solove 2013).
Privacy self-management is problematic for many reasons. Firstly, there are severe
cognitive problems that undermine privacy self-management:
“(1) People do not read privacy policies; (2) if people read them, they do not
understand them; (3) if people read and understand them, they often lack enough
background knowledge to make an informed choice; and (4) if people read them,
understand them, and can make an informed choice, their choice might be skewed by
various decision making difficulties.” (Solove 2013.)
Besides these cognitive problems that prevent people from making rational choices,
there are structural problems as well: people might be able to manage privacy with a
few entities, but the average American visits nearly a hundred websites per month and
does business online and offline with countless companies. There are too many entities
collecting and using personal data to make it feasible for people to manage their
privacy separately with each unity. Moreover, information is collected over time which
makes it virtually impossible for people to weigh the costs and benefits of giving up
their privacy (Solove 2013.) Data aggregates slowly and bits of innocuous information
can say a lot in combination. This makes it practically impossible to manage the data
and make meaningful judgments about the costs and benefits of revealing it. Individual
privacy breaches are often small and dispersed, but cumulative in nature. (Solove 2013,
pp 1889–1891.) Gordon Hull (2015) says that effectuating privacy preferences is
difficult also because the choice is not actually “free”: social cost of being outside e.g.
Facebook can be too high to bear. He also criticizes privacy self-management by
arguing that it “isn’t about protecting people’s privacy; it’s about inculcating the idea
that privacy is an individual, commodified good that can be traded for other market
goods” (Hull 2015).
The right to be forgotten means that a person can have digital data deleted so that
third parties can no longer trace him (Weber 2011). The data subject has the right to
obtain from the controller of data the erasure of personal data and the abstention from
further dissemination of such data (Szekely 2014). This has only fairly recently been
recognized as a fundamental right. There is no consensus on what exactly a right to be
forgotten means, and its status is unclear: is it a right, interest, ethical or social value, or
policy aim; is it in need of reinforcement or to be created from scratch (Koops 2011).
In continental Europe the right to be forgotten is understood as being contained in the
right of the personality, encompassing several elements such as dignity, honor, and the
right to private life. (Weber 2011.) The right to be forgotten is “a right to have the
government stop you from speaking about me”. In the United States courts have
usually favored the right to expression instead of right to be forgotten, unless sensitive
information is disclosed after interventions into the private sphere have been done in
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8frivolous and socially irredeemable forays (Weber 2011). The right to be forgotten has
raised the concern of subtle censorship and loss of information that is needed in future
(Ausloos 2012).
Destruction
The simple existence of information about a person can be a threat to privacy, because
it creates the risk that the person could be harmed later (Solove and Scott 2006, pp
487–488). Therefore, one solution for privacy problems is to destroy the information
altogether. Some writers have argued for “institutionalized government amnesia”: some
data must be destroyed after a certain amount of time unless there are good reasons for
retaining it. “Information ecology rules” explicitly regulating how long information can
be retained are nothing new. (Mayer-Schönberger 2011, pp 158–9.) The idea of
destroying information is often an extension to the purpose limitation principle: once
the information is no longer needed for the original purpose, it must be destroyed. Also
the right to be forgotten includes the idea of protecting privacy by deleting information
permanently. However, information can be destroyed as a paternalistic measure
without the request of the individual and regardless of the purpose of collection.
Anonymization
Privacy regulations are commonly triggered by the presence of “personally identifiable
information”. Privacy laws typically regulate only when personally identifiable
information is involved. (Schwartz and Solove 2011, pp 1814, 1816, 1890.) Therefore,
anonymization of data has become the favored technique in legislation, standards, and
guidelines for best practice.
Once the data is anonymized, it contains no more personally identifiable information
and can be shared with others. Anonymization seems to offer the best-of-both-worlds
compromise: analysts will still find the data useful, but unscrupulous marketers and
malevolent identity thieves will find it impossible to identify the people tracked. Nearly
every information privacy law or regulation grants a get-out-of-jail-free card to those
who anonymize their data. (Ohm 2010, pp 1703–4).
For decades technologists have believed that it is possible to robustly protect
people’s privacy by making small changes to data (Ohm 2010, pp 1703, 1706–7, 1714.)
Anonymization of data is commonly done by omitting identifying database values—
like names or social security identification numbers—entirely (data masking), by
replacing the values with new artificial identifiers (pseudoanonymization), or by
changing the values to a more generic form (by omitting the end of the zip code, for
instance). There are several anonymization techniques that can be used either to
produce aggregated information or anonymized data on an individual-level basis (for
details, see e.g. ICO 2012).
Unfortunately, anonymization is not without its cost: utility and privacy of data are
intrinsically connected. “Data can be either perfectly anonymous or useful but not
both”, says Paul Ohm. Increasing data privacy by anonymization means inevitably
reducing data utility. (Ohm 2010 pp 1704–1705.) Anonymization requires a
cost/benefit analysis: the benefit is the maintenance of confidentiality, while the cost is
the resulting degree of information loss (Naugler 1984, p 86).
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9Ohm argues that anonymization of data is more difficult than it has been believed. It
is true that a malicious adversary can use personally identifiable information such as a
name or social security number to link data to identity, but it has turned out that the
adversary can do the same thing using information that nobody would classify as
personally identifiable. (Ohm 2010, p 1704). This means that “personally identifiable
information” is not an immutable category. What is not personally identifiable
information at one moment can be transformed into that at a later juncture. The
identifiability of data depends upon context (Schwartz and Solove 2011, pp 1814, 1816,
1890.) As data gets aggregated, information that is not identifiable can be identified
(Solove 2013, p 1891).
According to an extreme view, all data in the world can, in one way or another, be
linked to natural persons. In that sense, all data is personal. (Szekely 2014.) There are
“data fingerprints”—combinations of data shared by nobody else in the dataset—that
allow at least a partial de-anonymization of data and re-identifying the people hidden in
it. Once a dataset has been partially or entirely de-anonymized it can be combined with
other datasets which opens further possibilities for re-identifying the people and de-
anonymizing new datasets (Ohm 2010, p 1723.)
This argument and examples of successful re-identification have been criticized
(Barth-Jones 2012). In the minds of computer security experts haunt super-users who
are “difficult to find, immune to technological constraints, and aware of legal
loopholes” (Ohm 2008). Others argue that there is no need for concern:
“…re-identification attempts will continue to be expensive and time-consuming to
conduct, require serious data management and statistical skills to execute, rarely be
successful when data has been properly de-identified, and, most importantly, almost
always turn out to be ultimately uncertain as to whether any purported re-
identifications have actually been correct.” (Barth-Jones 2016b.)
One counter-argument is that the attacker needs a perfect population register to link it
to a partially anonymized dataset and to estimate how successful his re-identification
has been. However, like super-users, perfect population registers are a myth. (Barth-
Jones 2016a; Yakowitz and Barth-Jones 2011.) However, the UK code of
anonymization takes the threat of re-identification seriously. It states that “the risk of
re-identification through data linkage [of various sources] is essentially unpredictable
because it can never be assessed with certainty what data is already available or what
data may be released in the future.” Initiatives such as open data, and the publication on
the internet of information released under freedom of information legislation, mean that
it is easier than ever to harvest and analyze large amounts of data. (ICO 2012, pp. 18–
27.)
Information safe haven approach
The last strategy is to create an information safe haven for personal information. In this
strategy, information is taken into archival custody and preserved there unmodified
under access restrictions until public access is possible. This is clearly the most
beneficial strategy for archives. For instance, Terry Cook (1991, p 22) finds census
data essential and says that it must be preserved permanently. He adds that “census data
is of course very sensitive and archivists must safeguard it from public disclosure until
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such time as the sensitivity has disappeared”. Elena Danielson shows by examples
about the private lives of Thomas Jefferson and his de facto wife Sally Hemings,
Thomas Mann, and Anne Sexton how survival of cultural heritage depends on trusted
archives and well-crafted donor agreements which protect persons and their families
(Danielson 2010, pp 184–185). Danielson writes
“It is the very facts that might seem most private and embarrassing that can be
essential information... It is the role of the archives to negotiate that private space and
allow potentially embarrassing facts that have a wider historical significance to
survive until they can be properly evaluated. The nature of taboo varies widely from
one culture to another as does the perception of what is private. Certain elements are
constant, and one is the need to preserve evidence from the private sphere.”
(Danielson 2010, pp 187–188.)
Danielson concludes that confidence in the discretion of the archives and in the
enforcement of restrictions demonstrably contributes to the creation and preservation of
important documentation (Danielson 2010, p 194). However, confidence is easily lost
if the discretion is not used wisely. Furthermore, the society has to be willing to respect
the archival institutions as sanctuaries of information. Otherwise, archives cannot have
public confidence.
The same mechanism is vital in all transfers of information across spheres. Public
records react to exposure like photographic film. If it is known that the information will
become accessible to outsiders it starts immediately to affect the content of records.
Therefore, there is the danger of a chilling effect, as has been already noted. It has been
argued that “good government flourishes in the dark”: only if decision-makers and civil
servants can be sure that privacy of their discussions is respected, free flowing
exchanges of thoughts are possible and also unpopular ideas are brought forward
without fear of unpleasant repercussions (Flinn and Jones 2009, p. 50). Thus,
protection of privacy is not only a problem for archives: it is also a tool for
guaranteeing that full and frank documentation is generated in the first place and then
preserved.
While public access to information is not possible, one can either deny all access or
allow limited access. European archivists have favored lengthy blanket restrictions (75
– 120 years) which seem too long from the American point of view: they are “as long
as the life of the subject, and often longer than the interest in the topic” (Danielson
2010, pp 196–200).
If limited access is allowed, there are several possible courses of action.  Firstly, the
archival institution can expect the donor to identify privacy concerns in the collections
they transfer to the archives. Alternatively, archival institutions can shift responsibility
to the users and make them responsible for the appropriate use of sensitive information.
Institutions may screen researchers and control their use of information by contractual
agreements. Institutional review boards by respected peers have been very successful in
preventing release of damaging material. The third approach is to screen information. If
screened information is only temporarily removed from the collection before access is
given, the collection retains its full informational value. (Danielson 2010, pp 209–211;
MacNeil 1992, pp 138–143.)  Basically, these variations turn an information safe haven
into a “fenced garden”.  Who controls contextual transfer in a fenced garden depends
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on the conditions for use. It can be even the person himself who grants the access to the
archives.
Summary
The choice of the strategy impacts on what information is preserved and how it can be
used. Most of the strategies are paternalistic in the sense that somebody makes the
decision about the fate of the information and its possible use in other contexts on the
behalf of the individual. However, privacy self-management and the right to be
forgotten are individualistic principles because the subject controls the use of the
information. The purpose limitation principle is in this respect neutral, because it is the
purpose of information collection that sets limits to the information usage. All the
strategies affect or limit contextual transfer in some way (see Table 1).
Table 1 Societal strategies and contextual transfer
Nature of the
strategy
Contextual transfer
Purpose lim itation principle Neutral Limited (purpose-bound)
Privacy self-m anagem ent
and the rig ht to be forgotten
Individualistic Limited (by consent) or not possible
Destruction Paternalistic Not possible
Anonym ization Paternalistic Yes, with loss of information
Safe haven approach Paternalistic Yes, with full information
The safe haven approach is the most favorable from the archival point of view, because
it allows contextual transfer without information loss. Destruction is the opposite: it
prevents all contextual transfer and access to information.
The purpose limitation principle and privacy self-management together with the right
to be forgotten are problematic to archives. They may allow contextual transfer, but the
decision is not made by the archives and it is not based on impartial archival evaluation
of information’s value.
Anonymization offers the most complex set of challenges. If anonymization fails,
re-identification is a potential problem when users are granted access to anonymized
information. On the other hand, if anonymization is successful, archives are in danger
of storing information whose value for research and society is limited or diminished
from what it would have been without anonymization.
Discussion
One can easily see how societal strategies may in principle conflict with the archival
mission. If information cannot be transferred to archives because of the purpose
limitation principle, if it is destroyed without regard to the archival point of view, or if
it is preserved but some information is lost because of anonymization, the possibilities
for archives to take care of their societal function are diminished. If implementation of
the strategies takes place without regard to the needs of records and archives
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management—and especially cultural-historic usage of information—there is a danger
that archives cannot fulfil the function that they have: transferring usable information
from one point of time, place, and context to another.
However, whether there is an actual conflict at practical level depends on the
concrete situation, on local legislation and how the legislation is implemented.
Legislation may reconcile societal strategy with archival needs by excluding some
categories of personal information from the sphere of privacy protection, by
recognizing research interests or by allowing personal information in the custody of
archival institutions to be disclosed (MacNeil 1992, pp 79–80; see also Ketelaar 1995).
Terry Cook correctly notes:
There are sometimes legislative or statutory prohibition which prevent archivists
from viewing certain series of records in order to appraise them or which legally bar
the transfer of certain categories of records to the archives, or both. In such cases,
archivists (and their outside supporting communities) must lobby for legislative
amendments or administrative arrangements to overcome these prohibitions. Ideally,
archival legislation itself grants archivists right to appraise and acquire even sensitive
records. (Cook 1991, p 60.)
Frequently, however, legal standards fail in this respect and they either do not consider
the desirability of permitting research access to personal information, leave it to the
discretion of government agencies, or allow access only to records in a form which is
not individually identifiable (MacNeil 1992, p 90). In the case of the right to be
forgotten, the data protection legal framework does not address records management
considerations, or at least, not in any explicit, easily recognizable manner (Xie 2016).
The Finnish recordkeeping environment offers another example of how legislation does
not always lead to an optimal result. Finnish legislation often requires that personally
identifiable information is destroyed when it is not needed for the specific original
purpose. While legislation also often acknowledges the need to make exceptions and
transfer the information to archival custody, public agencies sometimes ignore this and
destroy information without considering its archival value (Arkistolaitos 2009). While
destruction of information is often a necessity—also archives are forced to destroy
personal information to keep the bulk manageable (see e.g. Cook 1991, p 3)—the
question is not whether information should have been preserved, but who has the right
to decide what information is preserved permanently and what are the grounds for this
decision. If societal strategies are implemented without regard to archival needs,
archival institutions have no say in this matter.
It is argued that the principle of right to be forgotten can and should only be applied
in situations where the individual has consented to the processing of personal data
(Ausloos 2012). This would often exclude information that is collected by public sector
organizations. Also Ivan Szekely (2010) argues that the right to be forgotten has a
limited applicability in archives. According to him the primary aim of historical
archives is to guarantee integrity of the documents in their care whereas administrative
archives aim to guarantee the truth value of the documents in their possession. The
right to be forgotten has limited applicability in both cases, since the archive must not
undermine the integrity of the documents, according to Szekely (2010.) However,
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Szekely’s argument does not show that the right to be forgotten could not be applied
against archival interests.
Archives have reacted to the idea of introducing the principle of the right to be
forgotten in the EU legislation with considerable anxiety, although the purpose of the
right is neither to limit academic research nor to hinder the preservation of historic past
(Szekely 2010). If archives is a kind of “collective” or “social memory” (Hedstrom
2010; Jacobsen, Punzalan, and Hedstrom 2013) the privacy self-management principle
and the right to be forgotten suggest that a person may choose to exclude himself from
this memory. The ethos of the right to be forgotten is opposed to the very idea of long
term preservation of information: the right refers to a situation where a historical event
should no longer be revitalized due to length of time that has elapsed since its
occurrence. The longer the origin of the information goes back, the more likely
personal interests prevail over public interests (Weber 2011.)
Destroying information is easily in conflict with the archival goal of preserving
information. For instance, the National Archives of Finland has had disagreements with
government agencies who would like to destroy information that the archives have
wanted to keep. The argument of the agencies has been that the information is too
sensitive to be kept in the archives (Orrman 2012.) In Finland, being hospitalized in a
mental asylum was marked in census records, for instance. This information was
retrospectively removed from the records in 1983. From an archival point of view the
danger is that the records do not give an undistorted view of the society and the
conditions in which they were created. For society, the danger is that gaining
compensation for past misdoings may be difficult, if there are no records proving the
harm for the individual. An example of this are the forced sterilizations that took place
in Sweden in years 1935 – 1975 in part on social and eugenic grounds (Orrman 2012.)
On the other hand, also archives have destroyed information to protect privacy. In the
Nordic countries, this is known as “ethical appraisal”. In Sweden, records about high
nobility family scandals in the fonds of the Svea Court of Appeal were destroyed
already in the 1860’s (Landahl 1950, Orrman 2012).
The concept of privacy often leads to thinking about ways to limit access to and use
of information. Privacy is a basic right in a democratic society. The right to privacy is
sometimes in conflict with other rights and values and it must be balanced against them.
(MacNeil 1991.) One should remember that data analysis may also have social benefits.
For instance, let’s imagine that over the course of the past decade a person has given
out 50 000 pieces of data and has not been negatively affected by this. One day, a
relative innocuous fact 50 001 gets combined with the others and reveals that the
person is at risk for contracting a highly contagious and lethal disease. (Solove 2013, p
1890.)
Anonymized data has diminished value for research. Data linkage allows the
research community to correlate different factors that may influence phenomena. For
instance, the linkage of employment records and mortality data greatly increases the
significance of research results in the area of occupational health and safety. (MacNeil
1992, pp 88–91.) In longitudinal research personal identifiers are necessary to enable
the researcher to track individuals or groups over time. Similarly, correlational research
which establishes relationships between characteristics of individuals and usually
requires the linking of personal information held in separate records systems. (MacNeil
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1992, p 134.) These possibilities are lost when data from different sources cannot be
combined.
Developments in data re-identification techniques may have consequences for
records and archives management practices and they should be followed closely by the
records and archives management community. Paul Ohm states that the failure of
anonymization forces privacy law to abandon its reliance on personally identifiable
information and find an entirely new paradigm on which to regulate information
privacy (Ohm 2010). Paul M. Schwarz and Daniel J. Solove instead argue that we
should build two categories of personally identifiable information, “identified” and
“identifiable” data, and to treat them differently (Schwartz and Solove 2011, p 1817).
The fact that personally identifiable information may be a mutable category is
something that records professionals should consider in their work. Archival practices
rely on the recognition of personally identifiable information in records: it is a
precondition both for defining valid access restrictions and weeding personal
information when necessary. Terry Cook has argued for “temporary pseudo-
anonymization” of paper records stating that records containing highly personal
information kept solely for their collective significance should not be made available
through descriptive tools which allow retrieval by a personal identifier during the
person’s lifetime. (Cook 1991, pp 7, 62.) In the digital environment such approaches
are likely to be less successful.
Our conception of personal information is reflected in records practices. According
to Jens-Erik Mai (2016) personal information can be viewed either as a “true
representations of state of affairs” or “signs which are open for interpretation and
negotiation”. Privacy theories that are built on the first approach focus on controlling,
limiting, and restricting access to the material information carrier of information.
Privacy theories in the second tradition focus on pragmatics of the information and the
situation and the aim is to regulate use, analysis, and interpretation of personal
information. (Mai 2016.) To my understanding, records practices today largely rest on
the first approach—on controlling, limiting, and restricting access. However,
considering the change of privacy issues in digital environment, archives should think
more about use, analysis and interpretation of personal information. The focus should
be less on defining and following access restrictions and more on questioning what can
be done with the accessed data. This is in sync with the general need to have “privacy
law’s timing adjusted”, as Daniel J. Solove has argued. Currently privacy self-
management and privacy laws focus heavily on the time of the initial collection of data.
However, it is often difficult to evaluate benefits and costs at that time and the
decisions would be better made at the time of particular uses of data (Solove 2013, p
1902.)
The mutability of the category of personally identifiable information creates
challenges for archivists when they try to reconcile different needs in the society.
Archivists have the unenviable task of reconciling legitimate but conflicting interests—
the individual’s right to privacy and society’s need for knowledge (MacNeil 1992, p 5).
Archivists are aware of needs for privacy, but they have also the responsibility to
promote the use of records: it is a fundamental purpose of the keeping of archives
(Dever 2012). Balancing the rights of the individual with the rights of the community
presents a problem to which legislative approaches offer less than ideal solutions
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(MacNeil 1992, p 62). “Public interest” has no abstract definition (MacNeil 1992, p 76)
and at times it is better served by secrecy than openness (MacNeil 1992, p 83).
Legislation may present a greater burden on the party objecting to the disclosure of
information, or vice versa on the party seeking access to personal information to prove
why it should be disclosed (MacNeil 1992, p 77). Finding a middle way between
various interests is not an easy task. Szekely (2010) says that satisfying the future
researchers' curiosity and serving the historical knowledge of future generations cannot
take place at the cost of the disproportionate infringement of the rights of the present
generation. He also believes the goals can be partially attained without the infringement
of the data subjects' information rights. Also Heather MacNeil (1991) asks if the
research constitutes a legitimate reason for disclosing personal information. She
answers by stating that “it is unlikely that the community as a whole will accept ethical
standards that give higher priority to research than to respect for human subjects”
(MacNeil 1991).
Conclusions
The ways privacy is protected in the society are significant for archives. They impact
the documentation that is generated in society, the extent to which this documentation
is preserved, and what kind of processes lead to decisions about preservation of
information. Records and archives management profession should be aware of possible
conflicts between the societal strategies and the archival mission and to be ready to
defend their perspective to get the archives recognition and acceptance in society. The
question is more than “archival” because it touches all the contexts that the records
may have. Records professionals should approach the issue holistically embedding the
management of privacy by design in recordkeeping, as ISO 15489-1:2016 suggests.
Digitalization has changed privacy issues. Reconciling different needs is becoming
harder than before because identifying personally identifiable data may be more
difficult to recognize. One should pay more attention than before to the possibilities of
using the information instead of only controlling access to it. This creates pressure to
develop new methods for privacy management that are less dependent on the early
identification of personal data and definition of fixed access restrictions and more
focused on the examination of possibilities to using the data. The first European code
of practice on anonymization (ICO 2012, p. 4,) provides a starting point for that.
Ideally, there would be a methodology for assessing risks that may result from linking
the data with other perhaps in part unknown sources.
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